------------------------------------------------------------------- Cannabis Control In Canada - Options Regarding Possession (The text of a new study from the Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, a federally funded think tank, proposes dropping jail as a possible punishment for marijuana possession. Instead, the offence would become a civil violation, subject to a fine only.) Date: Mon, 15 Jun 1998 11:03:46 -0400 From: Carey Ker (carey.ker@utoronto.ca) Subject: Cannabis Control in Canada: Options Regarding Possession To: mattalk@islandnet.com Here's a copy of the paper mentioned in the Ottawa Citizen article. Carey *** Cannabis Control in Canada: Options Regarding Possession A Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse policy discussion document prepared by the CCSA National Working Group on Addictions Policy1 Ottawa May 1998 1This policy discussion document was prepared by Eric Single, Benedikt Fischer, Robin Room, Christiane Poulin, Ed Sawka, Herb Thompson and John Topp on behalf of the Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse (CCSA) National Working Group on Addictions Policy. This paper was endorsed by the CCSA Board of Directors in April 1998. The views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect those of other organizations to which members of the National Working Group on Addictions Policy belong. The contributions of Michael Callaghan, Nady El-Guebaly and Diane Jacovella to the development of this document are gratefully acknowledged. The summary of health effects draws heavily upon the work of William Corrigall and a recent WHO report (Cannabis: A Health Perspective and Research Agenda, WHO Division of Mental Health and Prevention of Substance Abuse, Document WHO/MSA/PSA/97.4, Geneva: World Health Organization, 1997). Communications regarding this paper should be directed to Professor Eric Single, 6 Mervyn Avenue, Toronto, Canada M9B 1M6. INTRODUCTION This policy discussion document details the considerations in choosing the most effective policy response to the problems caused by cannabis use, with a particular focus on the legislative options regarding cannabis possession. Information is presented regarding current trends in rates and patterns of use, and the potential health consequences of use are summarized. The paper then considers experiences with alternatives to criminal prohibition and various options regarding cannabis possession offenses. There is little doubt that cannabis use adversely affects the public health and safety of Canadians. Cannabis users are subject to a variety of adverse health consequences, summarized below, and cannabis use is associated with poor work and school performance. While there is little evidence that cannabis is a causal factor in crimes of violence or crimes of acquisition, cannabis is implicated in a small but significant number of motor vehicle accidents. Furthermore, recent national and provincial surveys indicate that the use of cannabis is increasing among youth. At the same time, the development of an effective response to the potential problems caused by cannabis use is hampered by funding cutbacks to prevention programming and difficulties faced by the criminal justice system in enforcing drug laws aimed at deterring use. The current law prohibiting cannabis possession and trafficking appears to have had a very limited deterrent effect, yet it entails high social costs and diverts limited police resources from other pressing needs. It should be noted from the outset that the existence of health and safety risks per se does not dictate the legislative response to cannabis use. The goal of cannabis policy is not only to minimize the harm resulting from use, but also to minimize the costs and harm that may result from attempts to control use. This entails a balancing of considerations. Attempts to minimize harms of cannabis use through rigorous enforcement can increase enforcement costs and adverse individual consequences of criminalization. While reduced enforcement and more lenient sanctions against users would address the latter concerns, this could potentially result in increases in cannabis use and the consequent health and safety risks. Thus, the key issue concerns selecting the legislative option which provides the best balance between reducing levels of cannabis-related harm and at the same time reducing enforcement costs and adverse individual consequences. By the same token, the existence of medical uses for cannabis does not dictate the legislative response to recreational cannabis use. While there is increased evidence that cannabis has medical uses, the following paper focuses on issues involved in how to best control recreational cannabis use and prevent problems associated with such use. There are mechanisms by which THC may be made available for legitimate medical purposes, regardless of the policies in place regarding non-medical use. This policy discussion document only concerns non-medical use of cannabis. Extent and health effects of cannabis use After caffeine, alcohol, tobacco and certain prescription medications, cannabis is the most popular psychoactive drug in Canada. It is the most commonly used illicit drug in Canada. In 1994, 7% of Canadians 15 years and older reported using cannabis during the previous year, and roughly one in four had used it at some point in their lives. Reported rates of cannabis use are particularly high among street youth, ranging from 66% in Halifax to 92% in a Toronto street youth study. The rate of cannabis use has remained relatively stable for the past 10 years. For example, the yearly prevalence was 7% in both of the last two national alcohol and drug surveys in 1989 and in 1994. However, cannabis use in the previous year increased from 6.5% in 1989 to 8.4% in 1995 in Alberta. There are also recent indications that cannabis use is increasing among youth. A 1997 student survey in Manitoba found rates of use in the prior year increased from 32% in 1993 to 44% in 1997. Nova Scotia also experienced a substantial increase, from 17% in 1991 to 32% in 1996. Current use among students in New Brunswick increased from 17% in 1992 to 21% in 1996. A recent student survey conducted by the Addiction Research Foundation in Ontario found 23% of students reported use in the past year in 1995, up from 13% in 1993. The trend toward increased rates of young users in Ontario is consistent with trends in the US and Europe. Most use of cannabis in Canada is sporadic or experimental. According to the 1995 Ontario student survey, less than 2% of students had used it daily in the previous four weeks. In a 1994 survey of Ontario adults, less than 1% reported daily use. Even weekly use is relatively uncommon-about 2% of the total sample had used cannabis at least once a week in the last year and more than 80% of users had used cannabis less than 40 times in the past year. There is currently considerable misinformation about the physiological consequences of cannabis use. Although occasional use often occurs with relatively little or no subjective negative effects for the user, it is a myth to consider cannabis to be a benign drug. There is no doubt that heavy cannabis use has negative health consequences. The most important of these are the following: Respiratory damage Marijuana smoke contains higher concentrations of some of the constituents of tar than tobacco smoke, is hotter when it contacts the lungs, and is typically inhaled more deeply and held in the lungs longer than tobacco smoke. Research has shown a link between chronic heavy marijuana use and damage to the respiratory system similar to that caused by tobacco. The adverse respiratory effects of cannabis are, of course, related to smoking as a means of ingestion, and do not occur when cannabis is eaten or otherwise ingested. Long-term marijuana smoking is associated with epithelial injury to the trachea and major bronchi, and with alterations in cells mediating the immunological response of the lungs-changes which leave the lung open to injury and infection. Heavy, habitual consumption has been linked with bronchitis. Although a link between marijuana smoking and cancer has not been firmly established, there are case reports of cancers of the aerodigestive tract in young adults with a history of cannabis use. These are of concern because such malignancies rarely occur under the age of 60. Physical co-ordination Cannabis impairs co-ordination. This brings with it the risk of injury and death through impaired driving and other accidental causes. North American studies of blood samples from drivers involved in motor vehicle crashes have consistently found that positive results for THC, the main psychoactive compound in cannabis, are second only to alcohol. However, blood levels of THC do not necessarily demonstrate that the driver was intoxicated at the time of the accident. In addition, many drivers with cannabis in their blood have also been found to be intoxicated with alcohol. Inferences drawn from the THC levels in drivers involved in motor vehicle accidents are, however, consistent with experimental studies of driving. These studies have shown that cannabis can impair components of driving behaviour such as braking time and attention to traffic signals. However, subjects appear to realize that they are impaired, and compensate where they can. For example, they slow down and focus their attention on the driving task when they know a response will be required. Such compensation is not possible when unexpected events occur, or if the task requires continued attention. In many respects the effects of cannabis on driving behaviour are similar to those of alcohol, but there are differences. For example, in one study alcohol was found to increase risk-taking behaviour by drivers, while cannabis tended to decrease it. The combined use of alcohol and cannabis is particularly likely to cause impairment. Pregnancy and post-natal development Cannabis use by women who are pregnant may affect the fetus. Maternal cannabis use has been linked to a shortened gestation period and low-birth-weight infants. The longer-term, post-natal consequences of maternal cannabis use appear to be subtle. Recent research has suggested that exposure to cannabis in utero can affect the mental development of the child in later years. For example, up to three years of age there appear to be no consequences of maternal cannabis use. By four years of age, offspring of regular cannabis users showed reduced verbal ability and memory, and by school age these deficits were supplemented by decreased attentiveness and increased impulsiveness in children of the heaviest users. Memory and cognition The effects of cannabis on memory appear to be variable, and may depend on the test that is used. Overall, the effects seem to be modest. However, the question of whether chronic use would produce serious impairments of memory, particularly if such use occurs during development, is not yet answerable. Studies of adult cannabis users, conducted several decades ago, suggested that the drug has little effect on cognitive function. More recent research has demonstrated that long-term use produces deficits in the ability to organize and integrate complex information, and this may arise from attentional or memory impairments. Psychiatric effects Cannabis use has been linked to a number of psychiatric effects. The most significant of these is the cannabis dependence syndrome. Cannabis-dependent individuals will continue to use the drug despite adverse consequences to physical, social and emotional health. Impairment of behavioural control in dependence, and accompanying cognitive and motivational impairments, can adversely affect productivity at work or at school. The risk of developing dependence increases with use; it has been reported that one-third to one-half of those who use cannabis daily for protracted periods of time may become dependent. Other psychiatric disorders have been linked to cannabis. There is clearly an association between cannabis use and schizophrenia, but it is not yet known whether cannabis use precipitates schizophrenia, or whether the association reflects the increased use of drugs, including cannabis, as a consequence of schizophrenia. In addition, clinical observations have identified a range of so-called "cannabis psychoses" following heavy use of the drug, which remit within days of abstinence. The higher the concentration of THC, the higher the risk of psychiatric complications. However, these disorders have not been well defined, and it is not clear that they are different from the effects of high doses of the drug. Some of these cases may arise if pre-existing psychotic problems are unmasked by drug use. Reference has also been made to the existence of an "amotivational syndrome" resulting from extensive cannabis use. While there is reasonable evidence that heavy use of cannabis can affect motivation, the production of a syndrome with identifiable symptoms outlasting the period of drug use and withdrawal remains to be demonstrated. This question may have been clouded by studies of the effects of cannabis use on educational performance in adolescents in which individuals most likely to use the drug may have lower motivation to succeed academically. Other adverse health consequences Research has shown that cannabis can also alter hormone production, and affect both the immune system, and cardiovascular function. The implications of these findings for human health are unclear at present. Law enforcement and costs Canada's enforcement of criminal drug control laws is relatively vigorous by international standards. In 1995, there were a total of 63,851 drug offenses under the Narcotic Control Act (NCA) or Food and Drug Act (FDA), or 220 offenses per 100,000 population. Of this drug offense total, 45,286 offenses were cannabis offenses, and of these 31,299 were cannabis possession offenses. In other words, 70% of all drug offenses that occurred in Canada in 1995 were offenses involving cannabis. As many as 49%-approximately half of all drug offenses-were offenses for the simple possession of cannabis. After a period of decline in the 1980s in the total of all cannabis offenses, as well as in cannabis possession offenses as a proportion of all drug offenses, these figures started to climb again from 1991 on. Offenses involving cannabis are the only category of drug offenses which have increased consistently since 1991, and they are therefore responsible for the overall increase in drug offense numbers since 1991 in Canada. Thus, enforcement of laws against cannabis possession-typically involving small amounts for personal use-now results in half of all Canadian drug offenses. While the enforcement costs are generally higher for trafficking and offenses involving other illicit drugs, clearly cannabis possession cases consume a considerable amount of law enforcement resources, diverting limited resources from other pressing needs. Cannabis possession enforcement varies considerably among regions in Canada, and particularly with regard to urban and rural areas within regions. For 1995, the cannabis possession offense rate per 100,000 for British Columbia is 246, compared with 92 for Ontario and 52 for Quebec, with the rest of the provinces somewhere around the Canadian average of 104. Differences in rates of use would only account for a small part of these regional variations. Furthermore, differences in rates of use would not account for the generally lower rates of enforcement in particular urban areas. The cannabis possession offense rates in Toronto (41) and in Montreal (43) are lower than their respective provincial averages. On the other hand, the rate in Vancouver (260) exceeds the overall rate in British Columbia. There is only imprecise data on the number of cannabis possession cases which result in custodial sentences. The most recent available data from Statistics Canada indicate that 14% of the Canadian prison population was in jail for drug offenses in 1991, but it is not clear what kind of drugs and what kinds of offenses contributed to this figure. Data on offenses, charges and convictions are not maintained and computerized by drug offense or drug category type, so that justice process and outcome data are not available for systematic large-scale analysis. When records were kept by drug category, the data indicate that cannabis possession offenders were infrequently sentenced to jail or prison; however, given the high number of possession cases, cannabis offenders constituted a significant number of persons given custodial sentences. In 1981, 5.2% of cannabis possession offenders received a custodial sentence, 64.8% received a fine and 25.3% were discharged. More recent data suggest the same pattern may still exist. Information from the 1993/94 Adult Criminal Court Statistics Survey of nine Canadian jurisdictions (not including BC, Manitoba and New Brunswick) indicates that of 23,160 drug possession charges under Section 3 of the Narcotic Control Act (covering all scheduled substances including cannabis), 15% received a prison sentence (not including one-day jail sentences), 18% a probationary sentence, 59% a fine, and 8.2% another disposition (including discharges) as primary sentences. The average prison sentence for this charge category in the nine jurisdictions surveyed was 41 days. There is considerable provincial variation in prison sentences for drug possession charges-the percentage of such charges receiving a jail sentence in Nova Scotia and PEI stands at 3%, compared with 20% in Ontario. Similar disparities are found with regard to the average length of prison sentences, which is nine days in Prince Edward Island compared with 55 days in Alberta. These figures include both cannabis and other illicit drug offenders, but it is likely that the same provincial and urban/rural differences occur with regard to cannabis possession cases. It has been estimated that approximately 2,000 Canadians are sent to jail every year for cannabis possession. Data are lacking regarding the nature of these cases. It is likely that many of these cases involve more serious charges which were reduced to simple possession after plea-bargaining. Also, a considerable number of these offenders are likely to have been jailed for defaulting on payment of a fine. The potential effects of fine defaulting are thus an important issue to consider with cannabis possession sentences, especially since this offense often involves individuals from the lower socio-economic stratum or people not capable of paying substantial fines. Apart from the adverse consequences to the individual offenders of being jailed, considerable costs are involved for governments-the per-diem costs of incarceration in Canada are approximately $150. It has been conservatively estimated that the dollar costs of illicit drug enforcement to Canadian police, courts and correctional services total more than $400 million a year. The costs of police investigations, court processing and custodial sentences are generally considerably higher for cases involving trafficking or illicit drugs other than cannabis. Nonetheless, as cannabis possession accounts for approximately half of drug charges, it is clear that cases involving possession of cannabis for personal use account for a substantial proportion of these costs. In addition to costs to the justice system, cannabis possession cases involve other social costs such as the adverse consequences to the individual offenders. These include employment impacts, economic impacts due to payment of fines and lost time from work, and family discord caused by arrest. Even in cases involving a non-custodial sentence, there are serious and often poorly understood criminal record consequences for the offense. Over the past three decades, there have been more than a million arrests under Canada's drug laws, and there are hundreds of thousands of Canadians who have a criminal record as a result of a conviction for possession of small amounts of cannabis. There is little empirical data on the impact of a criminal record, but the list of potential adverse consequences is extensive. Anyone with a criminal record is at a disadvantage in subsequent criminal proceedings: a criminal record may influence a police officer to lay a charge; it may be grounds for denying bail; it can influence a crown attorney to proceed by way of indictment rather than by summary conviction; it may be raised to impeach the suspect's credibility as a witness; and it may result in more severe penalties as dictated by various criminal statutes. Entry to Canada or other countries may be denied to persons with criminal records and a drug conviction may prevent a landed immigrant from obtaining Canadian citizenship. Under federal and provincial statutes, a criminal record may be used to show a lack of good moral character and deny an offender employment in certain professions, such as law, architecture, veterinary medicine, psychology, ambulance driving, auctioneering, real estate and law enforcement. A number of attempts have been made to mitigate the consequences of a drug offense, including the provision of pardons and discharges for offenders. Unfortunately, the discharge provisions of the Criminal Code and the pardon provisions of the Criminal Records Act provide very limited relief. A discharged offender is legally deemed not to have been convicted and can honestly deny a criminal conviction, but he or she would have to answer affirmatively to any of the following questions: "Have you ever been arrested, found guilty of, pled guilty to, or been sentenced for a criminal offense?" In a Toronto study of cannabis offenders, the likelihood of being unemployed or suffering other adverse consequences was unrelated to whether or not the offender received a discharge. Pardons also provide only very limited relief. A pardoned offender cannot truthfully deny having a criminal record-the pardon merely "vacates" a conviction or discharge, meaning it negates legal disabilities which automatically result under federal law. Thus, a pardoned offender regains the right to run for political office or apply for certain federal government jobs. However, a pardon has no impact on local or provincial police files or media data. In any case, most drug offenders are unaware of the pardon provisions and few have availed themselves of them. International treaty obligations Canada is a signatory to the three main international drug treaties, namely the 1961 Single Convention, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Vienna Convention. The fundamental principle of the Conventions concerning the regulation of cannabis (and other scheduled drugs) is that the signatories are obliged to establish control systems that prohibit the availability of and trade in such drugs, except in specified circumstances such as for medical purposes. However, the treaties are ambiguous on the control of cannabis for personal or recreational use. The key questions that remain are (a) whether personal cannabis use and possession for such purposes are included in the punitive requirements and provisions, (b) whether the punishments need to be "criminal" in nature, or if other deterrents or diversion procedures may be used instead, and (c) whether and how exceptions to these requirements can be made, e.g., in response to national constitutional principles, or for special forms of cannabis, including use for medicinal purposes. The parameters for personal cannabis use and possession are set out by the 1988 Vienna Convention which says in Article 3(2): "Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offense under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention...." However, in regard to these offenses, Article 3(4)d provides: "The Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment, or in addition to conviction or punishment of an offense established in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article [above], measures for treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social reintegration of the offender." The International Narcotic Control Board (INCB) explicitly points to the fact that in terms of use and possession of controlled drugs, there is room for modified or alternative measures to punishment by the criminal law: "None of the conventions requires a party to convict or punish drug abusers who commit such offenses even when they have been established as punishable offenses. The party may deal with drug abusers through alternative non-penal measures involving treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation or social integration" (1992:4). And a recent publication of the UN International Drug Control Programme noted that none of the "three international drug Conventions insist on the establishment of drug consumption per se as a punishable offense. Only the 1988 Convention clearly requires parties to establish as criminal offenses under law the possession, purchase or cultivation of controlled drugs for the purpose of non-medical, personal consumption, unless to do so would be contrary to the constitutional principles and basic concepts of their legal systems. None of the Conventions requires a party to convict or punish those who commit such offenses, even when they have been established as punishable; alternative measures may always substitute for criminal prosecution." (UNDCP, World Drug Report, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997:185). These parameters, set by the International Conventions and their executive enforcement bodies, thus imply in the Canadian context that there is a clear requirement to make the personal possession of cannabis a legal offense de jure, sanctioned with a form of legal punishment. There is also a requirement that illicit drugs, including cannabis, be subject to seizure and confiscation. However, the statute, procedure, or punishment does not necessarily have to be criminal in nature, and there is no per se exclusion of the wide realm of sanctions (including intermediate or conditional sanctions, such as fines, discharges, probation, or conditional and diversion sentences) available in contemporary legal practice. Moreover, education, treatment or social reintegration measures can clearly be substituted for any legal sanction. Deterrent effects of the current law The Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Bill C-8), proclaimed in 1997, provides maximum sentences of $1,000 fine and/or six months imprisonment for first-time cannabis possession offenders, and double the amounts for repeat offenders under summary conviction proceedings. The extent to which the current law succeeds in deterring cannabis use is not clear. With regard to the "general" deterrent effects of the law, i.e., the impact of the law in preventing cannabis use in the general population, it would appear that the enforcement of current law against cannabis possession has a very limited deterrent effect. Cannabis use remains high despite a high level of enforcement and there is no clear relationship between changes in enforcement and levels of illicit drug use over the past several decades. This is perhaps not surprising, as general deterrence is unlikely if actual and perceived risks of apprehension are low, as in the case of cannabis use. Cannabis users are likely to believe that their behaviour will go undetected and there is empirical support for this belief. Despite the best efforts of enforcement agencies, less than 1% of cannabis users-and a much lower percentage of drug use incidents-are detected in Canada every year. This doesn't necessarily mean, however, that the current law has not had any general deterrent effect, because rates of cannabis use might have been even higher under a less punitive policy. Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests that the general deterrence has not been substantial. In surveys, most nonusers cite health concerns as the reason for their abstention rather than concerns about legal sanctions. Similarly, conclusive evidence is lacking but it appears that the law also does not have a substantial "specific" deterrent impact, i.e., the deterrent effect on subsequent cannabis use by convicted offenders. The Le Dain Commission found no evidence that the law had a significant "specific" deterrent effect on drug-taking behaviour following conviction, and a study of convicted cannabis offenders in Toronto found little or no impact on subsequent use. One year after being found guilty of cannabis possession, 92% of the drug users reported continuing use, typically at levels similar to those reported at the time of conviction. The few who ceased using were experimental or infrequent users before being arrested. Experience with alternatives to criminal prohibition In light of the high costs of enforcement, the adverse individual consequences of criminalizing users, and the lack of evidence of a substantial deterrent effect, a number of jurisdictions have attempted to shift the control of cannabis possession or use away from the use of criminal law and/or to provide less severe punishment for users. In the 1970s, 11 American states established a civil penalty model for possession of small quantities of marijuana. Most of these provisions applied to first-time offenders only, and imposed a fine of an amount between $100 and $250 on offenders. For example, the 1976 Moscone Act in California converted the possession of up to an ounce of cannabis from a felony into a misdemeanor. Enforcement was diverted to other illicit drugs and trafficking. It was estimated that the conversion of the cannabis offense saved the state of California $1 billion each subsequent year in criminal justice expenditures. Follow-up evaluations of similar measures in other states similarly concluded that the removal of jail as a sentencing option reduced costs to enforcement and the justice system without leading to increases in cannabis use. While there were modest increases in cannabis use in many of these states following the change in law, there were greater increases in cannabis use in those U.S. states which retained more severe penalties. Thus, there was little change in the long-term trend in cannabis use, and there were no changes in cannabis use that could be attributed to the reduction of penalties. Starting around the mid-1970s, the Dutch drug control system allowed its public prosecutions department a broad discretion not to prosecute cannabis possession offenders in circumstances "where prosecution would have no beneficial effect in reducing the risks involved". The effect of this discretionary prosecution policy has been that the possession of small amounts of cannabis is tolerated in legal practice by Dutch authorities, while law enforcement has continued to concentrate on large-scale traffickers. In recent years, most German states have followed the Dutch model, whereby prosecutors withdraw the majority of charges against simple cannabis possession offenders. In none of these jurisdictions has there been evidence of an increase in cannabis use since these measures were put into place, and cost savings to the government have been considerable. In the early 1990s, two Australian jurisdictions-South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory-converted the simple possession of cannabis (less than 25 grams or five plants) into a civil offense through the introduction of a "Cannabis Expiation Notice" (CEN) system. The offenses are not criminally prosecuted or penalized, there are no criminal consequences, and the maximum fine is $150 (it should be noted that the consumption of cannabis in public places continues to be a criminal offense). However, offenders are required to go to court if they fail to pay the CEN fine within 60 days. From the available evaluations of the CEN system, the following conclusions emerge. First, there is no evidence of a differential change in cannabis use rates in CEN jurisdictions, as compared with rates reported from jurisdictions where the CEN model was not in effect. Second, the CEN system seems to have resulted in a considerable "threshold-lowering" effect in drug enforcement, since the CEN was procedurally easier to issue and sustain than an arrest. Thus, despite stable use rates, the number of offenses recorded by enforcement authorities increased disproportionately after the introduction of the CEN system. Furthermore, there have been substantial changes in offender characteristics. Enforcement under the CEN scheme seems to focus disproportionately on the male, and especially the lower socio-economic status and/or aboriginal, offender. An argument can thus be made that the conversion to civil penalty in Australia produced a sort of a "net widening" effect with an increased class bias. Also, a considerable number of CEN recipients-approximately 45%-fail to expiate (i.e., pay the fine), and thus eventually end up before the courts. Finally, the Australian state of Victoria recently converted its cannabis control law so that the criminal offense remains and a court appearance is likely, but the court is directed to record a small fine without recording a conviction. Legislative options to reduce the adverse consequences of a cannabis possession charge Thus far, information has been presented on rates and patterns of cannabis use, the associated health and other adverse consequences, and the problems involved in attempts to deter use via criminal sanctions. There are clearly major direct and indirect costs of the current control of cannabis possession through the criminal law with little evidence of a substantial benefit in reducing cannabis use. Considerable leeway is provided regarding policy options under the international drug control treaties and a number of other jurisdictions have attempted to reduce penalties for cannabis possession. In the Canadian context, the following policy alternatives should be considered. This is not an exhaustive list of potential legislative options. For example, it does not include various proposals for removal of the possession offense (decriminalization) or the provision of a legal source of supply of cannabis for users (legalization). It is limited to those options involving less dramatic changes to the current law which would retain the offense of cannabis possession (although not necessarily as a criminal offense) but reduce the penalties and other consequences to offenders. 1. "Fine Only" Option under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act The "fine only" option refers to measures which would amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to exclude jail as a sentencing option for simple cannabis possession, making a fine the maximum penalty for cases involving simple possession of cannabis. This modification would maintain simple cannabis possession as a criminal offense so the criminal record consequences would remain. However, the experience in other jurisdictions which have reduced the maximum penalty for cannabis possession to a fine indicates that there would be considerable savings to the criminal justice system with little, if any, impact on rates of cannabis use. It would also be in keeping with public opinion-in the most recent national survey, 27% of respondents stated that possession of cannabis should be legal and another 42% believed it should be against the law, but subject to either no penalty or a fine only. Only 17% favoured the current law whereby cannabis possession offenders are subject to a potential jail sentence, and the remaining 14% expressed no opinion. Thus, approximately two thirds (69%) of Canadians now favour removal of jail as a sentencing option for cannabis possession. 2. "Civil Offense" Option The "civil offense" option is another type of "fine only" option. It refers to proposals to exempt the offense of simple possession of cannabis from the criminal law by converting it into a civil offense with a fine under the recently enacted federal Contraventions Act. The "civil offense" option differs from the first option in at least two significant ways. First, the inability to pay a fine under the Contraventions Act does not lead to imprisonment. Second, a civil violation under the Contraventions Act is deemed not to be a criminal offense and a conviction for violating this Act is not deemed to constitute a criminal record. This would take the offense out of the criminal system, while ensuring some uniformity in the handling of cannabis possession offenses across Canada. It is expected that such a reform would result in a considerable savings in legal costs and other criminal justice system expenses, and the criminal record consequences of a cannabis possession offense would be ameliorated, if not entirely eliminated. A difficulty with this option is that some provinces have yet to agree on a Memorandum of Understanding with the federal government concerning the Contraventions Act, and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act might have to be amended to provide an exact penalty for cannabis possession cases that are handled in this fashion. 3. "Diversion" Option This option refers to measures designed to specify and encourage use of post-trial diversion mechanisms for simple cannabis possession offenders. In particular, Bill C-41 (the "Alternative Sentencing" law) presents a number of such options, including "conditional sentences". Under such provisions, the offender's criminal sentence is suspended while the offender complies with alternative sentencing conditions, e.g., community service or treatment. A variety of concerns, however, arise with such an option. First, the use of such diversion alternatives falls into the discretion of the courts. Therefore, diversion in many instances does not reduce the workload of the court system, but rather increases it. Second, the alternative sentencing provisions in many instances are not proportionate to the severity of the offense; many conditional sentences involve a lengthy period of criminal probation. Third, all conditional sentences automatically result in a criminal conviction and record. Fourth, widespread diversion should only be adopted once clear and justifiable guidelines are developed regarding the most appropriate circumstances in which to apply diversion, and agreements are reached with treatment agencies regarding workable treatment protocols that have a reasonable chance of helping the diverted offenders. If treatment is deemed appropriate, the treatment modality should be determined by the agency providing the treatment. Conditional sentences for drug offenders often involve mandatory treatment, which is of dubious effectiveness and may not be appropriate for the majority of cannabis offenders who are not regular users. Concerns have been expressed that the diversion option would combine the worst features of both criminal and non-criminal control, increasing costs with little or no benefit. Diversion to treatment or community service is certainly desirable in many cases, particularly for heavy cannabis users and those involved with other illicit drugs, but it does not appear to be a solution to the problems of the current law. 4. "Devolution to Provinces" Option This option refers to measures which would devolve the jurisdiction of the control of cannabis possession to the provinces. The federal government could legislatively concede jurisdiction over the control of cannabis possession to the provinces, and put the onus on them to establish suitable control schemes (as, for example, have been devised for various drinking and driving offenses) in their own jurisdictions. Such a devolution could be justified by emphasizing the primary nature of drug use control as a health-and thus a provincial-task, as implied in a Supreme Court decision in the early 1980s. On the one hand, this devolution model might lead to locally more acceptable solutions (e.g., the provinces might allow for municipal control schemes in the form of by-laws, as for tobacco smoking restrictions), as is currently discussed for the control of street prostitution. On the other hand, such a model would potentially undermine the equity and consistency principles of the law in Canada, due to discrepancies among provincial or local regulations. In particular, it could lead to jurisdictional disputes and problems regarding international treaty obligations if a province interpreted this measure as enabling it to remove all cannabis possession offenses and/or provide a legal source of supply. Without knowing the nature of the control systems that would replace the current arrangements, it is not possible to judge the relative merits of this option. However, it is clear that this option should only be adopted with the full agreement of the provinces and once the provinces have developed a coordinated strategy to take on this responsibility, including legislation that would be required for implementation. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The severity of punishment for a cannabis possession charge should be reduced. Specifically, cannabis possession should be converted to a civil violation under the Contraventions Act. The current law involves considerable enforcement and other criminal justice costs, as well as adverse consequences to individual drug offenders, with little evidence of a substantial deterrent impact on cannabis use, and at best marginal benefits to the public health and safety of Canadians. As a minimal measure, jail should be removed as a sentencing option for cannabis possession. The available evidence indicates that removal of jail as a sentencing option would lead to considerable cost savings without leading to increases in rates of cannabis use. Punishing cannabis possession with a fine only would be consistent with current practices and prevailing public opinion. The vast majority of Canadians no longer favour jail sentences for simple possession of cannabis. Among the various options aimed at reducing the severity of a cannabis possession offense, discussed above, the civil violation option offers the best opportunity to achieve the most appropriate balance between the need to reduce the harms associated with cannabis use and the need to restrain the costs and harms involved in attempts to control use. Consistent with international treaty obligations, this option would retain a cannabis possession offense, albeit subject to a fine only. At the same time, it would remove cannabis possession from the criminal law, preclude imprisonment due to failure to pay fines, and eliminate the criminal record consequences of a conviction. However, this option will be limited to those Canadian provinces which have agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding with the federal government concerning the Contraventions Act. These provinces might serve as pilot jurisdictions to test the effectiveness of a civil violation option for cannabis offenders. 2. Diversion of cannabis offenders to treatment or community service should be available, particularly for heavy users and those experiencing problems from the use of other illicit drugs, but diversion will not resolve the difficulties involved in cannabis enforcement. The widespread diversion of cannabis offenders would do little, if anything, to reduce the burden that cannabis cases place on Canadian courts, nor would it have any impact on the criminal record consequences for offenders. Diversion is clearly desirable in many cases and should be available, but it is not the solution to the difficulties caused by cannabis cases. Accused persons should only be diverted to mandatory treatment following a complete assessment, and if treatment is deemed appropriate, the treatment modality should be determined by the agency providing the treatment. 3. Any change in law should be subject to systematic evaluation of its impact on cannabis use and indicators of cannabis related harm, as well as impacts on criminal justice practices and costs. A well designed, comprehensive study should be implemented to evaluate the impact of any policy or legislative change, in order to assess the need for further action and inform future policy directions. 4. Any change in law which reduces the consequences for a cannabis offense should be accompanied by a strong message that this does not signal less concern with the potential problems caused by cannabis use. In particular, the change in law should be coupled with prevention programmes to address potential problems that may arise, and to indicate the government's continuing concern with the prevention of cannabis use and problems associated with it.
------------------------------------------------------------------- Re: Reader's Digest May cover story, "Australia's Methadone Mess" (An Australian physician specializing in drug treatment who has authored a book on methadone criticizes the biased American publication's "poor quality, sensational journalism, riddled with inaccuracies and misconceptions.") Date: Sun, 3 May 1998 13:02:48 EDT Originator: drctalk@drcnet.org Sender: drctalk@drcnet.org From: adbryan@onramp.net To: Multiple recipients of list (drctalk@drcnet.org) Subject: FWD: UPDATE - Reader's Digest May cover story "Australia's methadone mess". -- Begin Included Message -- Date: Sun, 03 May 1998 09:42:11 +1100 From: Andrew Byrne (ajbyrne@ozemail.com.au) To: ADCA Listserve (update@adca.org.au) Subject: UPDATE - Reader's Digest May cover story "Australia's methadone mess". Sender: owner-update@wilma.netinfo.com.au Dear Colleagues, This month's Reader's Digest has as its leading cover story "Australia's Methadone Mess". It is poor quality, sensational journalism, riddled with inaccuracies and misconceptions. The header states that methadone is "condemning many to a life of misery and even death". The message seems to be that tired old notion that 'methadone is just replacing one bad drug with another bad drug and that must be bad'. It ignores the 30 years of research which consistently shows reduced mortality, fewer serious viral infections, improved employment, better family life and other benefits. It also ignores the large numbers of patients who successfully complete methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) each year. The very case history they choose to start and finish with almost certainly owes his life to his methadone treatment after 20 years of addiction. Very few heroin addicts live that long without treatment. Salvation Army spokesman, Brian Watters is quoted as saying that methadone for a heroin addict is 'just like a bandaid'. He advises an 8 month rehabilitation program in preference which he states has a 12 month abstinence rate of 33%. He does not explain how tens or possibly hundreds of thousands of young Australians could be accommodated in such treatment which currently only takes small numbers. Neither does he tell us what we should do with the other 66% who continue to use drugs. His 'bandaid' analogy may not be so bad - methadone is also familiar, cheap and readily available. It covers a nasty injury and it enables the person to be functional while natural healing occurs. Specialist Dr Aidan Foy and pharmacist John Malouf also state their unsupported opinions that methadone treatment has been over-rated and problematic. By whom and compared to what? I wonder if the very many young Australians who are alive today thanks to MMT would agree with them? Or those who have avoided HIV and/or hepatitis(?) Do they have any better ideas to reduce the rising death toll from heroin? So why does Dr Foy prescribe methadone and why did Mr Malouf dispense it? They represent extremely small minorities in their professions. This article is real 'terrorist' journalism ... with the same potential to kill and maim. Based upon a few negative observations amongst the multitude of documented benefits from this treatment, it is a biased piece of writing, possibly emanating from some boardroom in middle America. No objective or informed person could see methadone in such an unfavourable light. All independent reviews of methadone (including 2 recent ones in NSW) have found that the treatment is successful and should be more widely available. It does not suit every heroin addict and, like other treatments, is not 100% successful. To suggest that there is a massive methadone industry is ludicrous. It is probably one of the smallest and most carefully scrutinised 'businesses' in the country. Confusingly, the author also advises Australia to drop the 'harm minimisation' approach to drug use and 'follow the lead of the Northern Territory'!! She quotes 'Drug Watch International' (whoever they may be) as saying Australia is isolated in this policy. [We may also be unique in having a rate of HIV among injectors as low as 1% compared to over 40% in many other countries.] The author also omits to mention that in recent years, MMT has been introduced into almost every country in the western world as well as much of the eastern and third world. France has made buprenorphine (an effective alternative) available on prescription from any doctor. We are told that MMT costs taxpayers millions, but not how it saves much, much more as shown by every study which has been done. We are also not told that most patients (at least in NSW) pay up to $40 per week for their own treatment. Author Siobhan McMahon and research editor Elizabeth Craig should not sleep soundly until they have redressed some of the harm their work may do. Ms Craig, who called me prior to publication to check some 'facts', said that their company policy was 'zero tolerance' and that it did not approve of methadone treatment. It is unfortunate that there was no statement to this effect in their article which purports to be a genuine assessment of the treatment. It must be unusual for a publishing company to have a policy about a life-saving medical treatment, especially a traditional one that has been thoroughly researched over 30 years. Most of my dependency patients will recognise that this is a work of no substance, driven by a misguided loathing of addicts, drugs, doctors or some other factor. It is unfortunate that more impressionable people, including parents of heroin addicts may be persuaded that this proven treatment is actually a fizzer. You will not find the Reader's Digest in my waiting room! Comment by Dr Andrew Byrne .. *** Dr Andrew Byrne, General Practitioner, Drug and Alcohol, 75 Redfern Street, Redfern, New South Wales, 2016, Australia Tel (61 - 2) 9319 5524 Fax 9318 0631 Email ajbyrne@ozemail.com.au *** author of: "Methadone in the Treatment of Narcotic Addiction" and "Addict in the Family". *** Date: Sun, 3 May 1998 14:07:10 EDT Originator: drctalk@drcnet.org Sender: drctalk@drcnet.org From: "Barrington Daltrey" (basd@fastbk.com) To: Multiple recipients of list (drctalk@drcnet.org) Subject: Re: FWD: UPDATE> Reader's Digest May cover story "Australia's me I am a bit puzzled by the support for methadone programs on this list. I don't know the specifics, but here are two things that trouble me: First, there is a good article from Libertarian Party (UK) that goes into detail about heroin, and indicates that heroin itself has few side effects and little long-term effects for its users. (I don't know if it is true, just parroting what I read). The second point is that a friend's daughter-in-law recently had a heroin addicted baby. The mother was given methadone and the baby was given maintenance heroin until it was withdrawn from the substance. When I inquired why the baby would be given heroin, the answer was that heroin was safer for the baby and it was easier to get the baby "off" heroin. The methadone was less safe and more addictive. Based on that information, methadone seems to me to be a political solution and not a medical one. (The mother, by the way, used both -- methadone from the clinic and heroin from wherever, when she could get it.)
------------------------------------------------------------------- Drug Users Blamed For Crime Surge (The Sydney Morning Herald, in Australia, quotes Police Commissioner Peter Ryan saying the big increase in robberies involving knives and firearms in New South Wales, revealed in official figures released Thursday, is being fuelled by increased "heroin use and drug use generally.") Date: Fri, 01 May 1998 23:52:41 -0500 To: mapnews@mapinc.org From: trikydik@inil.com (trikydik) Subject: MN: AUS: Drug Users Blamed For Crime Surge Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Newshawk: Ken Russell Pubdate: Fri, 1 May 1998 Source: Sydney Morning Herald (Australia) Contact: letters@smh.com.au Website: http://www.smh.com.au/ Author: Bernard Lagan and Les Kennedy Subject: AUS: Drug Users Blamed For Crime Surge DRUG USERS BLAMED FOR CRIME SURGE The big increase in robberies involving knives and firearms in NSW, revealed in official figures yesterday, is being fuelled by the rising numbers of drug users, the Police Commissioner, Mr Peter Ryan, said. Knife-point robberies, the majority in Sydney, have increased by 77 per cent and gunpoint robberies by more than 33 per cent over the two years to December 1997, the figures show. Sydney had about 3,000 robberies last year involving a weapon other than a gun - mostly knives - compared with fewer than 1,700 the year before. There were about 1,000 armed robberies compared with about 700 in 1996. Commenting on the figures, Mr Ryan said: "I think there is an increase in heroin use and drug use generally and the only way people can manage to buy drugs is to steal, break into houses, break into cars and to rob people in the street. "The root cause of the majority of crimes of this nature are drugs and drug abuse and we need to be tackling that as an issue as well." Mr Ryan's remarks on heroin users were echoed by Dr Don Weatherburn, director of the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, which compiled the statistics from crimes reported to police. "Given a lot of involvement by heroin users in robbery, I think the best bet is that it is heroin which is driving it," he said. Mr Ryan said the increase in knife-related crime was not because it was now harder to get guns, but because there was a "determination among many people just to carry knives" - not for offensive purposes but because they thought they were going to be robbed. The media's portrayal of violence was at least partly to blame for the crime levels, he said. "What really worries me is the way that violence is portrayed on our televisions. "The way that the media portray the solving of disputes with violence - use this knife, use the gun - the hero is the man who uses the gun and there's no questions asked." Dr Weatherburn said the rising numbers of fatal heroin overdoses and increases in the numbers of people seeking treatment for heroin addition pointed to an increase in the number of users. The surge in knifepoint and firearm robberies was "an abrupt and dramatic change" because from the beginning of the decade to 1994 the number of robberies had been stable. The figures were released as the State Government is introducing new measures to combat knife attacks, including wider search powers for police, increased penalties for carrying prohibited knives and a ban, from today, on the sale of knives to those under 16. But Dr Weatherburn had doubts about whether these measures would deter drug users with knives. "Somebody who is desperate for a fix of heroin is not necessarily going to be deflected by the thought that someone might search them." He said knifepoint robberies could be reduced by police concentrating on known hot spots - a move Mr Ryan said later would be implemented. The Minister for Police, Mr Whelan, said the figures showed fewer crimes were on the increase and it was clear that under Mr Ryan "the police service is getting back to basics - fighting crime".
------------------------------------------------------------------- Experts Will Speed Up Work On Cannabis (The British Medical Journal notes physicians in the UK will continue their alchemical quest for a way to separate beneficial cannabinoids from herbal cannabis.) Date: Fri, 1 May 1998 16:15:21 -0800 To: mapnews@mapinc.org From: Olafur Brentmar (olafur@cdsnet.net) Subject: MN: UK: BMJ: UK Experts Will Speed Up Work On Cannabis Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Newshawk: rdwinthrop@mail.arrownet.com (R D Winthrop) Pubdate: Fri, 01 May 1998 Source: British Medical Journal (UK) Contact: bmj@bmj.com Website: http://www.bmj.com/ Author: John Warden, parliamentary correspondent UK EXPERTS WILL SPEED UP WORK ON CANNABIS Research into the clinical use of cannabinoids is to be put on to a new basis in Britain with the formation of a committee of experts who will draw up guidelines for good practice. The working party on the therapeutic uses of cannabinoids is being set up by the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain and will be headed by Sir William Asscher, a former chairman of the government Committee on Safety of Medicines. The aim is that the guidelines will encourage the Home Office to approve research licences which are currently being delayed. The development was reported by BMA witnesses to a House of Lords subcommittee inquiring into the use of cannabis and its derivatives for medical and recreational purposes and into whether any relaxation of the law is appropriate. Last year the BMA report Therapeutic Uses of Cannabis concluded that cannabis is unsuitable for medicinal use but that cannabinoid derivatives should be considered. Dr Vivienne Nathanson, head of the BMA's professional resources and research group, and Professor Heather Ashton, consultant writer for the BMA report, gave evidence to the Lords subcommittee last week. They reported a meeting last month with the chief medical officer at the Department of Health to discuss further action in moving forward clinical trials of cannabinoids. It was agreed that a new independent body to conduct such trials was required. Dr Nathanson welcomed the Royal Pharmaceutical Society's working party as a means of producing better research and development of cannabinoids so that the least possible delay occurs before clinical trials are started. Concern had been expressed, she said, over Home Office delays in issuing research licences, with about 14 applications pending. The new research protocols might help the Home Office to compare licence applications with a set of guidelines and decide which should be licensed. In a written submission, the BMA said that individual cannabinoids have a therapeutic potential in several medical conditions in which present drugs are not fully adequate. The long term effects have not been studied, but present evidence indicates that cannabinoids are remarkably safe. The accumulation of scientific evidence has been hampered by regulations restricting the use of cannabinoids to one clinical indication--as antiemetics in chemotherapy for cancer. The BMA wants a high priority given to carefully controlled trials of cannabinoids in patients with chronic spastic disorders that have not responded to other drugs. In the meantime there was a case for the extension of the indications for nabilone and ê-9-tetrahydrocannabinol for use in chronic spastic disorders unresponsive to standard drugs.
------------------------------------------------------------------- Turkey and Drug Traffic (A letter to the editor of the Irish Times from a Turkish diplomat disputes the newspaper's claim that his country is a main producer of illicit drugs. He says Turkey is just a transit country.) Date: Sun, 03 May 1998 10:44:25 -0400 To: mapnews@mapinc.org From: Melodi Cornett (mrhorse@kih.net) Subject: MN: Ireland: LTE: Turkey and Drug Traffic Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Newshawk: mjc1947@cyberclub.iol.ie ((Zosimos) Martin Cooke) Pubdate: Fri, 1 May 1998 Source: Irish Times (Ireland) Contact: lettersed@irish-times.ie TURKEY AND DRUG TRAFFIC Sir, - I read Jim Cusack's report on illicit drug trafficking (The Irish Times, March 10th) with keen interest. However, I think it needs some comments. As he rightly puts it, the heroin travelling to Europe is produced in refineries in many countries, but not mainly in Turkey. The local production and consumption of drugs in Turkey is negligible. Turkey is actually a transit country on the route from Far East-Central Asia to Europe. Regarding the production sites, as there exists no country as "Kurdistan", I think he was referring to the production places controlled by the Kurdish terror organisation PKK (namely as Kurdistan Workers' Party). This organisation, which fights against the territorial integrity of Turkey, has many production facilities in Northern Iraq and the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon (under effective Syrian control). Let me also give some figures to complement Mr Cusack's report. The amount of heroin seized in Turkey in 1996 makes up 64 per cent of the total seized in Europe and 40 per cent of the global total. In other words, 4.5 tonnes of the total 11 tonnes of the heroin seized in the world and of the 7 tonnes seized in a total of 28 European countries have been captured solely by the Turkish police forces. That is why the Turkish drug enforcement agencies have gained a praiseworthy reputation. They are currently hosting 21 drugs liaison officers from various European countries and have many of their own in Europe. However, even though Turkey has successfully carried out many joint drug or drug-related money-laundering operations with the US, Italian, Spanish, Danish and Dutch drug enforcement agencies (a total of more than a dozen in 1996), it cannot be argued that it is receiving full international co-operation. There are many examples of this. But worst of all is the chemicals route, which, just like the one between the Golden Triangle and Europe, never stops. The crucial chemical substances such as acidic anhyditrin vital for heroin production are mainly produced in European Union countries. Although the production of those materials are strictly prohibited under the relevant UN charters, the production and transportation of those materials stemming from Western Europe fuel the vicious circle. Furthermore, there are some European Union countries still not willing to put a stop to PKK activities in their territory. - Yours, etc., SELCUK UNAL Third secretary Embassy of the Republic of Turkey Dublin.
------------------------------------------------------------------- World Cities Against Drugs - A Global Perspective, May 12-13 in Stockholm, Sweden (A list subscriber says the conference sponsored by European Cities Against Drugs, ECAD, is expected to attract representatives from 500 cities around the world who will hear about the "success" of Swedish narconazism.) Date: Fri, 01 May 1998 23:01:14 +0200 To: press@drugtext.nl From: mario lap (mario@lap.nl) Subject: CAD publicity blurb ECAD publicity blurb: The City of Stockholm has the honour to invite you to take part in the global conference, 'World Cities Against Drugs - A Global Perspective', May 12-13, 1998. The conference is hosted and arranged by the City of Stockholm in cooperation with the European Cities Against Drugs (ECAD). At the conference, a 'Global Declaration on Drugs' will be launched, agreed upon in advance by signatories to the Declaration. The Declaration will be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations at the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs in June 1998. *** [John Yates writes:] Representatives from 500 towns and cities from across the world will be gathering in Stockholm to hear of the 'success' of Swedish narconazism. They will regail foreign journalists with propaganda about 'The Swedish Model' to be dutifully reported around the world. What they will not say is that their repressive policy is collapsing as drugs and drug related crime escalate out of control. >From Swedish TV news today, May 1: "A Stockholm man was was gunned down today in what police described as a settlement between drug gangs. The 27 year old man was shot in the stomach in front of his family while playing football. He is in a critical condition in Karolinska hospital. His assailant was overpowered and arrested. Stockholm police spokesman Evald Wigger said the hitman was sent by a drug gang to collect drug debts" Yeah, prohibition works. John Yates ** The drugtext press list. News on substance use related issues, drugs and drug policy webmaster@drugtext.nl
------------------------------------------------------------------- The Development of Drug Abuse in Sweden (A translation of an article by Leif Lenke, a lecturer in criminology at Stockholm University, in Oberoende, the official magazine for the Swedish National Organization For Help to Narcotics and Drug Addicts, critically examines the official version of the history of drug abuse in Sweden.) Date: Sat, 30 May 1998 11:20:01 -0800 To: mapnews@mapinc.org From: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org (MAPNews) Subject: MN: Sweden: The Development Of Drug Abuse In Sweden Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Reply-To: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Newshawk: Jan G. Quarfordt (jan.quarfordt@mailbox.swipnet.se) Pubdate: May 1998 Source: Oberoende (Sweden) Contact: info@rfhl.se Website: http://www.rfhl.se Translation: Jonas Thorell and John Yates Author: Leif Lenke, Lecturer in criminology, Stockholm University Note: The "Oberoende" is the official magazine for RFHL (National Organization for Help to Narcotics and Drug Addicts). THE DEVELOPMENT OF DRUG ABUSE IN SWEDEN Drug abuse in the form we observe it in society today began in earnest during the 1960's. Sweden was actually one of the first countries in Europe to develop an epidemic of intravenous drug abuse. The rest of Europe has since followed suit. Drug abuse has played a major role in the control policy debate and has had great effect upon criminal statistics and criminal policy. Narcotics are also the most common reason given for intensifying police co-operation in Europe. Forms Of Abuse In Sweden Characteristic of heavy drug abuse in Sweden is the large scale injection of amphetamine that began amongst Swedish abusers. This is in contrast to other countries where heroin became the dominant drug of heavy abuse. Amphetamine differs from heroin in that it is a stimulating and activating drug and not numbing and sleep inducing. Another difference is that heroin, but not amphetamine, cause strong withdrawal symptoms. This has the effect of making heroin more dominant in the lifestyles of its abusers as they need maintenance doses approximately every four hours. Amphetamine addicts on the other hand must stop their abuse after a few days as the drug no longer has any effect and tiredness begins to take over. Why amphetamine became so dominant amongst Swedish abusers has not been thoroughly investigated. Abuse began amongst bohemians and artists in Stockholm during the 1950's and spread from there to the criminal underworld. As a result, new recruits to drug abuse were persons connected with institutions such as prisons and juvenile delinquent reform schools. From the middle of the 1970's, heroin abuse enters into the picture but has so far not constituted more than one third of the total of heavy drug abuse. Heroin abuse seems however to be increasing its share of heavy abuse over time. During the whole period since the beginning of the 1960's the most common form of drug abuse has been the smoking of cannabis. This is still so today despite the introduction of newer drugs like ecstasy and cocaine during the 1990's. The Official Picture Of The Development Of Drug Abuse The overall picture of the development of Swedish drug abuse has long been unclear. The official version can be summed up by saying that the liberal narcotics policies of the 1960's and 70's resulted in steadily increasing problems until a shift in policy in the direction of tougher laws around 1980 pushed back drug abuse on a scale that lacked precedent in Europe. The figures quoted are based upon two types of statistics. The first and most important concern the frequency with which young people have tried drugs. Statistics from the Institute of Public Health (1993) which have been presented to the rest of the world show that experimentation with drugs amongst young people dropped drastically with the policy shift of 1979-80. From the assumption that reduced experimentation with drugs automatically leads to a reduction in the development of heavy drug abuse, the conclusion has been drawn that recruitment to heavy abuse has decreased along with the reduction in drug experimentation. This hypothesis is also said to have support in the fact that the proportion of younger heavy abusers was lower when statistics of the heavy abusers of 1992 were compared with those of 1979 A critical examination of the official version of the development of abuse. In Swedish drug policy there are differing opinions on two crucial points. These differences concern cause and effect in regard to policy and the development of abuse. There are different opinions regarding time context, that is to say, when developments went in one direction or the other and to what extent this can be linked to differences in policy between the different periods. Some facts are clear. For instance the peak in the Swedish drug epidemic, according to all sources, occurred at the beginning of the 70's. That is 5-10 years before the new policy, which took all the credit for the dramatic decrease even though drug abuse was decreasing before the new policy had time to take effect. Another fact is that the decline that is used as evidence of reduced new recruitment to heavy drug abuse occurred abruptly at the end of the 1980's. That is more than five years after the new policy achieved full effect. This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that it is only amongst the absolute youngest that a reduction can be seen to have occurred in the statistics of 1992 compared with those of 1979. One question that needs to be asked is that if there are not other explanatory factors at work than an increase in law enforcement involvement in narcotics policy. It has been possible to show that not only a reduction in experimentation with narcotics occurred in the 1980's. There was also a decrease in alcohol consumption and that cannot be attributed to the police or to the effects of narcotics policy. This is even more true of sniffing which also shows a similar downward trend. Regarding the reduced proportion of young heavy drug abusers in the figures for 1992, two factors are worth taking into consideration. One is that youth unemployment in Sweden during the 1980's was at its lowest ever at around 2 %. Compare that number with the average for the European Union at the same time of around 10-30 %. The connection between youth unemployment and the level of drug abuse, especially regarding heroin, has been shown in a comparative study between several member states of the European Union. The fact that the decline occurred during the last years of the 80's also indicates that the HIV epidemic, which was given much attention around 1985, can have had an effect upon the prevalence of abusers. It has been shown that this epidemic caused panic among swedish abusers. A similar decline can also be found in the development of heavy drug abuse in Norway at around this time Epidemic Vs Trend The founding father of "The drug free society", Nils Bejerot, introduced the term epidemic as a way to illustrate how drug abuse develops. This was met with some justifiable criticism, since the introduction of this medical term implied that abusers infected innocent people and especially young people with their abuse. The epidemic model is accepted within the social sciences to describe fads and other social phenomenon. Characteristic for such "epidemics" is that they tend to rise sharply then decline and not uncommonly to more or less die out. The development of the Swedish amphetamine epidemic could be interpreted as such a phenomenon since abuse and especially new recruitment diminished to only a fraction of its original size within just a couple of years and with only comparatively modest measures taken by the authorities. On the other hand, when the authorities at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 90's turned the thumbscrews on drug abusers, no noticeable positive effect on abuse was observed. Drug use was criminalised in 1988 and was intended to give "clear signals" to young people that experimenting with drugs was not only unacceptable and deplorable but criminal as well. As can be seen in diagram 3, this did not accomplish anything. Nor was anything accomplished when the law was tightened in 1993 by introducing prison into the scale of punishments as well as carrying out tens of thousands of urine tests in order to detect drug abusers early and either frighten them or force them into compulsory treatment programmes. If we examine another side of the "new" Swedish drug policy, forced treatment has not either been able to show positive results. Instead, Sweden has what is perhaps the highest mortality rate in the western world amongst heroin addicts. Narcotics related deaths are also continuing to rise in Sweden. It is also significant that now, as the figures for drug experimentation amongst young people have risen dramatically for five successive years, this is suddenly no longer regarded by the authorities as an indication that hard drug use is also rising. Instead this abuse is attributed to "party drugs" and fads etc. The fact is however that the greatest increase is in cannabis abuse and this is still most commonly found amongst young persons of low education living in larger cities. It is a bad omen that behind the increasing drug use, in which smoking heroin is beginning to play an increasing role, there are again rising trends of alcohol abuse and sniffing amongst young people. And not least a persistent and alarmingly high rate of unemployment.
------------------------------------------------------------------- Abolish the Slogan "A Drug Free Society" (A translation of an article by Henrik Tham, a professor of criminology at Stockholm University, in Oberoende, the official magazine for the Swedish National Organization For Help to Narcotics and Drug Addicts, criticizes Sweden's fanatical war on some drug users.) Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 16:54:58 -0800 To: mapnews@mapinc.org From: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org (MAPNews) Subject: MN: Sweden: Abolish The Slogan "A Drug Free Society" Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Newshawk: Jan G. Quarfordt (jan.quarfordt@mailbox.swipnet.se) Pubdate: May 1998 Source: Oberoende (Sweden) Contact: info@rfhl.se Website: http://www.rfhl.se Translation: John Yates (bobo@personal.eunet.fi) Author: Henrik Tham Prof. Criminology University of Stockholm Note: The "Oberoende" is the official magazine for RFHL (National Organization for Help to Narcotics and Drug Addicts). ABOLISH THE SLOGAN "A DRUG FREE SOCIETY" A couple of years ago, Swedish Television showed a film about South Africa. The film was about the love affair between a white man and a coloured woman. The couple knew of course about their country's laws against this type of relationship, and they did everything they could to conceal it. They never went out together, they only met at night, she used the backdoor to his house and was very careful not to keep her possessions in his apartment. But the police were onto them. During a raid on his apartment the police found, at the bottom of his laundry basket, a pair of panties which were sent to a laboratory for forensic analysis. In the final scene the woman is seen lying in the gynaecologist's chair with her legs apart while a male doctor puts on his plastic gloves. The final evidence of their crime would be found inside the woman's vaginal canal. The crime the couple committed against South African law did not have any actual victims. Therefore the crime was difficult to prove, no one had reported anything, no one was hurt (beside the couple), no one risked getting hurt. And yet at the same time the government insisted that whatever the cost - measures were to be taken against this crime. The consequences were inevitable, the state literally had to penetrate this woman in order to determine through her bodily fluids if she was a criminal. This South African administration of justice shocks us and yet at the same time, the same way of thinking has become part of Swedish narcotics policy. Consumption of narcotics is illegal and punishable in Sweden. Surreptitious use, which is not directly visible through harmful actions, is seen as a particular danger to society. Evidence can only be secured when the government uses force to take blood and urine samples from its citizens and thereby determine if any crime has been committed. It has not always been like this in Sweden. During the 1970's Swedish drug policy had a relatively humane attitude towards drug users. At the beginning of the 1980s this policy changed direction. The abuser was now regarded as the only irreplaceable link in the drug supply chain and if he could only be stopped from using drugs then inevitably the whole chain would collapse. Efforts were concentrated on the user in the form of criminalisation of consumption, frequent raids and forced treatment. The was to be, according to the official slogan, "a drug free society". Well, it might be objected, hard drug abuse is a problem both for the individual and for society, and a harder and more repressive drug policy could be accepted if such a policy resulted in a decrease in the damage caused by drugs. However any such result is difficult to ascertain. The number of drug users increased by 40% between the late 1970s and early 1990s. And even if there was a fall in the numbers of those being recruited to drug use in the 1980s, the numbers dropped even more during the so called "piss-liberal" 1970s. The costs of the harder drug policy however are obvious and include disregard for principles of justice, introduction of forced treatment and increased use of imprisonment. A rise in drug related deaths cannot be excluded either. Sweden criminalised, in contradiction with Swedish legal practice, the actual use of narcotics in 1988. In an internal investigation by the Department of Justice of the introduction of punishment for personal drug use, it was stressed that "it is in principle wrong to criminalise acts which are directed towards ones own person". The same investigation maintained that blood and urine tests are "deep violations of the integrity of the person". Despite this, in 1993 the police were given authority to perform these tests and up to the end of 1997 39.000 blood and urine tests have been taken. During the 1980's special laws were passed in Sweden allowing forced treatment for adult abusers. Such treatment has never been shown to have any positive effect on drug abuse. On the other hand Sweden is relatively unique from an European perspective in having such laws. Imprisonments for narcotics related offences have tripled since the late '70s. The long prison sentences together with application harder narcotics laws has contributed to the worsened situation in prisons. The number of drug related deaths are high seen from an European perspective. This is particularly notable as the higher mortality rates are mainly found amongst heroin addicts and this group is limited in Sweden compared with other countries. The high and rising death toll should be considered alongside the official Swedish claim of a successful narcotics policy. Against this background the question must be asked if the Swedish restrictive narcotics policy, by neglecting harm reduction, is not actually contributing to the high death toll. Despite this control policy, Sweden has not become "drug free". Quite the opposite, developments during the 1990's point in the other direction, at least in regards to occasional drug use. But what then, are the reactions? Proposals for even more of the same medicine. Telephone tapping has been introduced and used previously mainly in regards to narcotics related crime. Now proposals for the use of bugging are foremost in the investigative process. Once again narcotics legitimise the introduction of "unorthodox measures". The thousands of blood and urine tests taken by the police to prevent narcotics use are not considered enough. Organisations and employers now demand compulsory tests in schools and workplaces. The police want the power to give drug users emetics in order to prove narcotics crimes. And the countries largest opposition party now demands life imprisonment for serious drug crimes. To these existing and planned control costs should be added the direction the policy debate is taking. Swedes cause friction with their European neighbours by conceitedly marketing the superiority of their narcotics policy while at the same time avoiding listening to the experiences of other countries. EU parliamentarians from other countries who propose decriminalisation of cannabis are described as narcotics Mafia in Sweden's largest evening paper. Legal heroin and clean needle distribution programmes that could reduce the suffering of addicts are dismissed from the debate by pointing out that "society has to underline its rejection of drugs". Young people are alienated from adult society when the rave culture is defined as a narcotics problem that the police have to solve with top priority. And the Prime Minister's adviser in criminal and drug political questions, member of parliament Widar Andersson can, without any politic criticism say: "The freedom of speech should be limited for those who overtly or covertly spread drug propaganda". The slogan "a drug free society" is a fundamentalist slogan. It is an expression that means we have to eliminate something whatever the price. The demand for a drug free Sweden becomes the demand for a drug user free Sweden. Every addict becomes one addict too many and the costs to achieve this goal never become too high.
------------------------------------------------------------------- Drug Wars and the Open or Closed Society (A translation of an article by Leif Lenke, a doctor of criminology at the University of Stockholm, in Oberoende, the official magazine for the Swedish National Organization For Help to Narcotics and Drug Addicts, criticizes Sweden's unsuccessful war on some drug users as the vehicle for bringing about a repressive, close-minded society where an open and honest discussion is impossible.) Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 16:50:01 -0800 To: mapnews@mapinc.org From: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org (MAPNews) Subject: MN: Sweden: Drug Wars and the Open or Closed Society Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Reply-To: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Newshawk: Jan G. Quarfordt (jan.quarfordt@mailbox.swipnet.se) Pubdate: May 1998 Source: Oberoende (Sweden) Contact: info@rfhl.se Website: http://www.rfhl.se Translation: John Yates (bobo@personal.eunet.fi) Author: Leif Lenke, Doctor of Criminology at the University of Stockholm. Note: The "Oberoende" is the official magazine for RFHL (National Organization for Help to Narcotics and Drug Addicts). DRUG WARS AND THE OPEN OR CLOSED SOCIETY In 1984 Nils Christie and Kettil Bruun published the book "The Good Enemy". In it they describe how a powerless group of drug addicts were singled out as enemies by a society in need of scapegoats. The war on drugs and drug users was presented as a ritual and collective purification process in which society drove out evil symbolised by drug addicts. Fourteen years later the war continues with unabated enthusiasm, although, judging from available statistics, without any success. The authors, Christie and Bruun, limit themselves in their description of the drug war to drug users, but they are not the only ones who have been defined as enemies. The other enemies are dissenters in the drug-political debate. They seem to constitute nearly as great a threat to society as the actual drug addicts. Dissenters are regarded as traitors to the well being of the nation, sometimes they are decried as advocates of the devil. In war, descriptions of the enemy must be simplified and derogatory so that hate and the will to fight can be mobilised. There is no room for nuances, everything is either black or white, good or evil. Drug addicts are described as "drug fixated crime machines" while dissenters are maligned as "drug liberals" or "the apologists of legalisation". In the political debate surrounding Swedish narcotics policy the war is ever present: "Are you for or against the Swedish model? Are you with us or against us? Are you friend or enemy?" Politically Correct A body of politically correct perceptions has developed around drug questions. The politically correct perception is built upon a moral order where narcotics are singled out as the evil drugs and where the lifestyle of drug users is seen as a threat to conventional society. From a scientific perspective we can see that cigarettes and alcohol are a much greater threat to health than narcotics. However, the politically correct position is not built upon knowledge and rational argument, but upon morality and dogma. There are many risks involved in not identifying with the politically correct position in narcotics policy. For politicians it means reduced credibility and less votes. Civil servants in national and local government risk losing their jobs or seeing their careers go down the drain if they express ideas contrary to the official policy. In the same way the careers and subsidies of researchers are threatened if they publish reports or articles that contain criticism of the politically correct position. Vaccination Campaign The authorities often speak of the importance of "vaccinating" young people and parents against drug misuse. According to available statistics, this vaccination has not been particularly successful, at least not in the way that was intended. The vaccination campaign has however "succeeded" in another area. It has got politicians and officials to think nearly identically in a very complicated and composite question. In the name of the drug war, the controlled society has been imprinted into its citizens and made them resistant to their own freedom of thought. This resistance can result in an unwillingness to know of other models than the self proclaimed successful Swedish model of limiting abuse and treating addicts. Is the drug wars threat to freedom of thought and expression a sign that we are distancing ourselves from what Carl Popper called the open society? In the open society it is permitted to publicly propose and to criticize proposals for solutions to social problems. Open and critical discussion then lays the ground for the implementation of reforms. Open and critical discussion is also necessary for citizens to control authority. But in order for public discussions to take place, says Popper, there must be institutions that guarantee freedom of thought, speech and demonstration as well as there being a certain level of education. The Closed Society What happens to democracy and open and critical discussion when researchers, politicians and officials are silenced? According to the newspaper Kommun-Aktuellt, civil servants dare not criticize their employers or side with the 'wrong' opinions. They are scared of losing their jobs. Is the drug war an indication that we are moving towards a more closed society where there is no room for doubt or critical opinion? The closed society is characterised by a magical and irrational clinging to traditions and habits instead of a rationally guided and critical questioning. But Popper warns us that the more we try to suppress rationality and truth and instead strive for the ideals of the closed society, all the easier it is to create inquisitions and secret police. In this context it can be mentioned that Sweden's own 'Drug Czar', Widar Andersson, has written a document together with K-A Westerberg where he says that "Limits should be placed on the freedom of speech of those who covertly or overtly spread drug propaganda". But who is it in the end who profits from the suppression of open and free discussion of narcotics questions? One thing is sure, it doesn't favour the clients. In sociology it is said that the old political opposites of left and right, capitalism and communism have been dissolved and that we need new opposites and areas of contention if history is not to end. The open or closed society where pluralism is opposed to fundamentalism is such a new pair of opposites. The German sociologist Sebastian Scheerer wonders if not the drug war is the cultural arena for that developing conflict. So at a basic level the drug war is about what sort of society we are to have - a pluralistic and open society or a fundamentalist and closed.
------------------------------------------------------------------- Closing Ranks, the Lost Opportunity of UNGASS (A translation of an article in Italy's Narcomafie about the United Nations General Assembly Special Session June 8-10 in New York, dedicated to promoting the world war on some drug users, says a commercial will soon appear on televisions around the world in an attempt to rally public support.) Date: Wed, 03 Jun 1998 00:58:16 -0400 To: mapnews@mapinc.org From: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org (MAPNews) Subject: MN: GE Italy: Closing Ranks, The Lost Opportunity Of Ungass Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Reply-To: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org Newshawk: Martin Jelsma Pubdate: May 1998 Source: Narcomafie - N. 5, Anno VI (Torino, Italy) Contact: abele@arpnet.it Website: http://www.arpnet.it/abele Author: Martin Jelsma Note: Published in Italian under title: "Serrare i ranghi!" CLOSING RANKS: THE LOST OPPORTUNITY OF UNGASS An elderly cleaning lady enters the huge empty UN aula in New York with her polishing cart, to get the venue spic-and-span for an important upcoming meeting. A voice in the background explains: `here, in this room, on the 8, 9 and 10 of June world leaders will join forces to confront the drug problem.' As the lady dusts off a globe, in the swaying movement, a roaring helicopter appears spraying herbicides, followed by a fast sequence of other images like burning drug crops, heavily armed soldiers and a farmer processing coffee. The voice ends with the slogan: "A drug free world - We can do it!" The commercial will soon appear on national television around the world in an attempt to rally public support for the "United Nations General Assembly Special Session to Counter the World Drug Problem Together". Advertising agencies are experts in capturing in a nutshell the content of a message, and the commercial makes perfectly clear what the UNDCP (United Nations International Drug Control Programme) hopes will be the outcome of UNGASS. In 60 seconds the proclaimed "balanced approach" is rapidly turned into what it really comes down to: a global attempt to close ranks in support of a "war on drugs". Although UN agencies usually carefully avoid using controversial military metaphors in articulating their anti-drug strategies, Mr Pino Arlacchi, UNDCP's Executive Director, didn't hesitate to invoke the image at a press conference in Vienna at the end of a week of preparatory meetings for UNGASS. "The `war on drugs' has not been fought and lost," he said. "It has never started." BACKGROUND The original impetus for convening a global meeting on drugs came from Mexico back in 1993, when she proposed to hold a real Summit on the issue. The idea was to facilitate a world-wide reflection on the efficiency and viability of anti-drug strategies over the past decade, in order to improve and adapt them with a view to strategies for the next century. After many deliberations and conflicts, the initial idea has since been narrowed down to a Special Session on the issue. The focus is on how to strengthen and expand current drug control policies ten years after the adoption of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In November 1996, the General Assembly formally decided to convene a special session, which should "be devoted to assessing the existing situation within the framework of a comprehensive and balanced approach that includes all aspects of the problem, with a view to strengthening international cooperation to address the problem of illicit drugs". It assigned the task of preparing the session to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, with its seat in Vienna, Austria. Acting as preparatory body for UNGASS, the commission met five times over the past year. A battle that was more or less lost at the very first `PrepCom' meeting (March 1997) centred on the proposal to have an "independent evaluation" of the efficiency of existing conventions. The idea was to commission independent experts to conduct such a study and prepare a document on the basis of which 'new strategies' could be proposed for the next century. The US, Great Britain and some others objected to an "independent" evaluation, with the result that the recently installed committee consists of the full chairing bureau of the PrepCom itself, plus some national delegates. "The main aim of their work will be to recommend how to strengthen future international cooperation against illicit drugs, and to identify measures aimed at reinforcing UNDCP's activities in the field of drug control." Independant evaluation is nowhere to be found. UNDCP Executive Director Arlacchi urged member states to send government leaders to attend the Special Session in New York. Many heads of state and ministers will be included in the national delegations, politicizing the debates. In the case of the drugs issue, this is generally a disadvantage. There is a growing gap between the drug experts on the one hand, where many of the deficiencies of the applied strategies are recognised, and the political level on the other hand, where fear of looking "soft on drugs" is paralyzing genuine reflection. Amongst politicians it seems to be conventional wisdom that the reason force has not worked, is that not enough has been applied and that the logical response, therefore, is escalation _ not re-evaluation. Absentees in UNGASS are the people most directly affected by drug policy: citizens of developing countries in which drugs production is taking place, and drugs consumers. In spite of numerous declarations of good intentions about the importance of including civil society in this global debate, direct non-governmental participation in the official meeting will be close to zero. However, some facilities will be available for parallel NGO activities. Many organisations are already planning to air critical views inside and outside the UN venue. AGENDA SETTING When the agenda-setting for UNGASS started, several delegations stressed that the upcoming global event should mark the end of the "era of finger-pointing" in the international drug policy controversies. The old dichotomy between producer and consumer countries should give way to the principle of 'shared responsibility' as the cornerstone of international drug control. The agenda, therefore, should reflect a balanced approach which includes all aspects of the drugs problem, and should focus on those points which have been underexposed in the existing conventions.The agenda is now clearly defined and does indeed reflect criticism emanating from developing countries over the past decade. Several issues currently emphasise the responsibility of the western world: demand reduction, chemical precursors, amphetamines, and money laundering. The PrepCom approved the following documents for the General Assembly in June: 1) a Political Declaration, to reaffirm and strengthen the international community's commitment to the slogan "A Drug Free World - We can do it!". 2) a document outlining the 'Guiding Principles on Drug Demand Reduction'. It will constitute "the very first international agreement whose sole objective is to examine the problems, both individually and collectively, that arise because a person might or does abuse drugs." 3) an 'Action Plan against Manufacture, Trafficking and Abuse of Amphetamine-type stimulants' (like XTC and speed); 4) `Control of Precursors', containing measures to improve international control of chemicals used in illegal drugs manufacture; 5) `Measures to promote international judicial cooperation', like extradition, mutual legal assistance, transfer of proceedings, etc.; 6) `Countering Money-Laundering', a document that reaffirms international commitment to the 1988 Convention provisions on proceeds of crime, and establishes principles upon which further anti-money laundering measures should be based; 7) a `Draft Action Plan on International Cooperation on Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development.' SCOPE Under the item `Eradication and Alternative Development', the UNDCP is trying to squeeze into the UNGASS agenda, its already highly controversial `Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy Elimination' (SCOPE). SCOPE calls for a "balanced approach" between law enforcement, alternative development and demand reduction, to rid the world of "the scourge of heroin and cocaine" within 10 year. By the year 2008 the UNDCP wants to have rooted out the problem at source - crop production. Alternative development is intended to receive the bulk of the nearly US$ 4 billion budget: 74%. Law enforcement is alloted 20% and demand reduction 2%. The UNDCP itself doesn't have innate funds, so it has appealed to the international community to commit itself to SCOPE to provide the necessary funding. The strategy focuses on eight key countries in three regions: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru in Latin America; the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar (or Burma as the surpressed democratic opposition prefers to call their nation) and Vietnam in south-east Asia; and Afghanistan and Pakistan in south-west Asia. The supply of illicit opiates and coca derivatives today originates in these "limited number of well-defined geographical areas", according to the UNDCP in summing up the favourable factors for this ambitious programme. Secondly, says the agency, "after three decades of experience, the international community is now equipped with tested methodologies and the know-how to tackle the problem in the producing areas. The strengthening of the drug control mechanisms in the regions concerned has paved the way for full-scale interventions and most producing countries have adopted well-defined national strategies and action plans that are ready for implementation." "At the same time," continues the plan's summary, "it is possible to monitor the areas at risk in order to prevent the `balloon effect' from nullifying the overall impact of elimination programmes." The "balloon effect" is the movement of cultivation to previously untouched areas as a result of increased enforcement in presently cultivated zones (while you squeeze one part of a balloon, the air simply moves to another part without reducing the total amount of air). The last favourable factor cited is the expression of a "clear political will and the adoption of a common agenda on the part of the international community". The Special Session "offers a historic opportunity for all positive forces to converge", according to the UNDCP. FUELING THE FIRE The UNDCP's attempt to convince the PrepCom to recommend that the Special Session endorse SCOPE didn't quite succeed. Delegations felt overwhelmed by the detailed elaboration of SCOPE, received shortly before the final PrepCom on 16-21 March. The Dutch delegation diplomatically called for "feasible goals" both "in substance and target dates" and added that "quantative benchmarks should not be an end in itself". Mexico sarcastically said it expected an equally detailed plan from the US to illustrate their intention to fully eliminate drug consumption over the same 10-year period, and proposed 2003 as target date for substantial demand eradication. Executive Director Arlacchi not only has to face scepticism from the delegates, but within the UNDCP he is considered a recently appointed outsider who overruled critical assesments of SCOPE by the agency's specialists. In Vienna corridors, he is nicknamed "El Ni=F1o", a kind of human equivalent of the meteorologic phenomenon which creates havoc world-wide. But UN Secretary General Annan says that the "renowned Italian crime fighter" has brought vitality and credibility to the UNDCP in its fight against drugs. Observers comment that the Executive Director has "considerable political support", which is clearly true from the US side. Arlacchi played an important and brave role in fighting the Mafia in Italy, but coca bush and opium poppy is something else, and the small peasants involved in its cultivation are no criminals. In his noble drive to deny organized crime an important source of income, he is also irresponsibly putting the onus for the problem on the shoulders of the relatively innocent growers of the raw material _ those who depend on these crops to survive _ who risk losing their livelihoods as the fight escalates. Although several PrepCom draft declarations call for respect for human rights, saving the environment, and active participation by local groups in the planning of alternative development projects, most peasants have had very negative experiences with drug control programs over the past decade, precisely with these issues. With SCOPE, Arlacchi risks fueling the fire of already heated social tensions in drug crop areas around the world. SCOPE relies heavily on partly existing national plans for its operationalisation, while intending to provide an integrated global framework and a multilateral legitimacy. Colombia serves as a good example to illustrate what the consequences in practice might be. COLOMBIA Currently, operations in Colombia to suppress illicit crop production consist primarily of chemical fumigation. Last year, 48.000 hectares of coca and poppy crop were eliminated through the aerial spraying of herbicides. Satellite monitoring shows, however, that the total area under drug-crop cultivation expanded 10 percent. The fields were simply moved to other areas - the `balloon' effect. These fields will be sprayed again next year -with a stronger granual herbicide- and cultivation (which in itself is not particularly friendly to the ecosystem) will again move to other regions. A vicious circle, leading to more and more health complaints among the local population and contaminating ever-increasing areas, is set in motion. There is grave concern about the long-term effects of the massive spreading of these chemicals in the vulnerable ecosystem of the Colombian Amazon tropical rainforest, where coca cultivation is concentrated. The Guaviare and other coca growing regions of Colombia were the scene of widespread social protest in 1996. An estimated 241,000 people participated in massive marches and roadblocks -one of the largest peasant mobilizations in Colombian history-to protest aerial eradication, lack of government support for economic development and the increasing presence of the Colombian military. In the violence that ensued, twelve people fell victim to extrajudicial executions and seven disappeared. A number of protest leaders subsequently received death threats and seven were later murdered. The UNDCP - for now - does not directly support fumigation projects in Colombia or elsewhere. The financial support and technical assistance (helicopters and training) is provided by the United States. The agency does support alternative development though, which, jointly with the forced eradication programmes, shape the counter-narcotics strategy of Colombia - the PLANTE (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo) presidential programme. The counter-strategy of the Colombian government, says SCOPE in describing the future country plan to eliminate illicit cultivation, "is based on two distinct, but complementary courses of action: the carrot and the stick". This complementarity principle also underlies Arlacchi's plan, according to which alternative development gains in effectiveness when it is backed by "consistently applied disincentives through law enforcement and eradication". "As the plan progresses, the importance of eradication will grow," notes SCOPE, both to stop cultivation attempts in new areas and resurgence in areas where alternative development has been implemented. To complement "tedious manual eradication", SCOPE includes a research and development plan for "environmentally safe" herbicidal chemicals and biological control agents. Uzbekistan is to be the site of the first experiment with a pathogenic fungus which kills the opium poppy, an agent that "should be safe, suitable and available for all poppy growing areas, especially in Central Asia." CONCLUSION Inherent in SCOPE's underlying logic lies a risk of increased repression, in spite of its proclaimed emphasis on alternative development methods. The complementarity principle combined with a deadline make escalation almost inevitable upon the year 2008 drawing closer. Without a very careful tuning into realistic estimations of results of prevention and demand reduction strategies, any strategies aimed at `elimination' of supply are unrealistic and may well be even undesirable. Such perilous illusions, encapsulated in the UNGASS slogan "A drug free world - We can do it!", might win broad and high-level political affirmation in New York, if critical voices have not been heard and delegations do not have the political courage to question them publicly. So far, UNGASS seems to offer very little hope to -and in fact is likely to heighten concerns for-the main victims the international community should be worrying about: the problematic user groups and the peasants caught up in the illegal economy. The world is likely to lose an historical opportunity with this UNGASS, which should have been devoted to evaluating the past decade and learn from its many failures, to analyse the colateral damage wreaked by the war on drugs, and to put on the table alternative strategies more consistent with the laudable original goals of defending human well-being and pursuing policies which protect people rather than cause more harm. The manifesto `for a just and effective policy on drugs' around which many organisations worldwide are uniting, lays out the basic principles for such an alternative strategy. Martin Jelsma Transnational Institute (TNI - Amsterdam) more information on UNGASS can be found on TNI's website: http://www.worldcom.nl/tni/drugs -------------------------------------------------------------------
[End]
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